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In 2016, the United States Supreme Court abandoned an almost
eighty-year-old federalism doctrine of dual sovereignty that governed
federal-state energy regulation jurisdiction.1 In FERC v. Electric Power
Supply Ass’n, the Supreme Court upheld regulations by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) and in doing so, rejected dual
sovereignty.2 Prior to this decision, the Supreme Court interpreted the
New Deal Era Federal Power Act (“FPA”) and the Natural Gas Act
(“NGA”), as establishing a bright-line jurisdictional rule.3 FERC was allo-
cated authority to regulate wholesale transmission while retail energy sale
was left to the states.4 Justice Kagan, writing for the majority, reasoned
that when FERC acts regarding wholesale energy transactions, it effects
the retail prices.5 Kagan dismissed this overlap as legally insignificant
and thus abandoned the bright-line rule of dual sovereignty.6
Shortly after deciding EPSA, the Supreme Court in Hughes v. Talen
Energy Mktg. found that regulation enacted by Maryland was beyond the
scope of state jurisdiction.7 While the Court answered some questions about
how the concurrent jurisdiction doctrine would be applied, there is still
uncertainty about what state legislation would be preempted by FERC.
While the doctrine is not yet complete, the Court’s decision to aban-
don dual sovereignty in favor of concurrent jurisdiction is appropriate for
modern energy needs. Presently, however, the role of federalism is blurred
and will need to become more defined. As the courts apply concurrent
* JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2018; BS Wilmington University, 2015. The
author would like to thank the staff of the William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy
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1 FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 766 (2016).
2 Id.
3 Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path of Energy Federalism, 95 TEX. L. REV. 399, 415 (2016).
4 See ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1594 (2015); Nantahala Power & Light
Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966 (1986).
5 FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 784.
6 Id.
7 Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1292 (2016).
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jurisdiction and define roles for the states and FERC, special care will be
required to ensure that the states will maintain their ability to innovate
as well as continue the nation’s progress towards cleaner affordable energy.
The Supreme Court must remain conservative and reach narrow holdings
as they create precedent in this dynamic and rapidly changing industry.
Part I begins by discussing the history of the FPA and the NGA
and the Supreme Court’s application of dual sovereignty in energy regu-
lation. The history will provide context and demonstrate that concurrent
jurisdiction is consistent with the intention of the FPA and NGA given
the modern energy market. In Part II, I will explain that while the doc-
trinal shift in federalism is beneficial, there are valid concerns about the
jurisdictional change. Part III will address the concerns raised in Part II
and will provide suggestions on how the courts should develop the juris-
dictional roles to ensure that the energy market can progress.
While there is existing scholarship on the newly created concur-
rent jurisdiction in energy regulation, this Note will demonstrate that
the late Justice Scalia’s concern about a “jurisdictional snarl”8 is legiti-
mate. I will address other concerns that will be raised as the doctrine
matures. However, this Note will explain that with care by the courts,
concurrent jurisdiction can be “unsnarled” resulting in a more effective
energy regulatory scheme.
These changes in the regulatory system come at a time where the
energy market is facing a great deal of change. For much of the 20th
century, utilities were monopolies that produced power in central facili-
ties and delivered it to customers via their own transmission lines.9 State
public utility commissions countered the monopolies by ensuring that the
rates and services were equitable.10 Presently, new technologies and en-
vironmental concerns have shaped how power is generated, transmitted,
and stored.11
Instead of exclusive centralized power generation, an increasing
amount of power is generated by solar panels on residential rooftops and
in small wind farms.12 These new energy sources require updated trans-
mission and advanced power management systems.13 Utilities are facing
8 ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1606.
9 Joel B. Eisen, Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead, But How Dead, and What Replaces




13 Id. at 3–4.
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competition from startups with innovative business models such as solar
leasing farms.14
The energy grid is changing to keep up with new power demands.
The power grid is becoming a smart grid.15 Consumers are becoming in-
creasingly able to generate power and sell it back to the grid.16 New technol-
ogies like battery storage and demand response are pushing the grid to
transform.17 The regional wholesale markets that comprise two thirds of
the energy market have only been in operation since the 1990s.18 Also in
that time, consumers in several states now have gained the ability to
choose to receive power from suppliers rather than traditional utilities.19
I. HISTORY OF FERC JURISDICTION
A. History of The Federal Power Act and the National Gas Act
In 1927, the Supreme Court in Public Utilities Commission of Rhode
Island v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co. held that the states were power-
less to regulate interstate commerce of electric utilities.20 However, at the
time of Attleboro, there was no federal agency to regulate interstate
energy regulation.21 The lapse in regulation of the interstate market
became known as the “Attleboro Gap.”22 In response to the Attleboro Gap,
Congress passed The Federal Power Act (“FPA”)in 193523 and the Na-
tional Gas Act (“NGA”) in 1938 to regulate the interstate energy markets.24
In the FPA, Congress granted authority to FERC (then the Federal Power
Agency) to regulate wholesale energy in the interstate market.25 In the
NGA, the same authority was given with regards to the interstate mar-
ket of natural gas for resale.26
14 See generally Innovative Solar Systems, http://innovativesolarfarms.com [https://perma.cc
/C9CK-TM6B] (last visited Jan. 21, 2018) (leasing land from farmers to build “solar farms.”).





20 See generally Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927).
21 Rossi, supra note 3, at 409.
22 Id.
23 Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2012).
24 Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717 (2012).
25 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2012).
26 17 U.S.C. § 717 (2012).
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B. The History of Dual Sovereignty
For much of the next eighty years, the jurisdictional roles as defined
by dual sovereignty was sufficient to ensure that no gaps in regulation
existed.27 The Supreme Court settled on a bright-line test for determining
state and federal authority.28 The test as defined in Federal Power Comm’n
v. S. Cal. Edison Co. relegated the wholesale of energy to the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission and left retail sale to the states.29 This
bright-line test “cut sharply and cleanly between sales for resale and direct
sales for consumptive uses.”30 The energy market was not as convoluted
as it is today.31 FERC and the states were able to legislate with relative
ease within their own domain.32
By the early 2000s dual sovereignty began to appear less effective
in energy regulation.33 This can be seen in the 2002 case of New York v.
FERC.34 While the Supreme Court did not go so far as to invalidate dual
sovereignty, it marked the beginning of the end for the doctrine.35 The
Supreme Court heard a challenge of FERC’s overhaul of power market
structuring rules known as Order 888.36 In response to energy monopo-
lies, FERC restructured the energy market by allowing equal access to
transmission lines though tariffs.37 This provided new entrants to the
industry a chance to compete in the market.38 After finding that the utili-
ties were impacting bulk power markets, FERC asserted authority under
sections 205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act.39
The Court rejected New York’s argument that Order 888 should
be invalidated for impermissibly encroaching into the state purview of
retail sales.40 However, the Court noted that wholesale and retail sale of
energy was not as neatly separated as it was when the FPA was enacted.41
27 Rossi, supra note 3, at 414.
28 Federal Power Comm’n v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 206–07 (1964).
29 Id. at 215–16.
30 Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 332 U.S. 507, 517 (1947).
31 Robert R. Nordhaus, The Hazy “Bright Line”: Defining Federal and State Regulation
of Today’s Electric Grid, 36 ENERGY L.J. 203, 207 (2015).
32 Id.
33 See generally New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002).
34 Id.
35 See Rossi, supra note 3, at 409.
36 New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 5.
37 Id. at 10–11.
38 Id. at 11.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 20.
41 New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 21.
2018] DUAL SOVEREIGNTY IS OUT 631
This was interpreted as indicating that the Supreme Court was beginning
to move away from dual sovereignty.42
II. THE BEGINNING OF DUAL SOVEREIGNTY’S END
The Supreme Court took another step away from dual sovereignty
in ONEOK v. Learjet.43 Decided in 2014, the case was the culmination of
several state antitrust lawsuits brought by retail natural gas buyers.44
FERC found that natural gas traders had been reporting false price and
trading information.45 Gas purchasers then filed state antitrust suits
alleging they overpaid for natural gas because of the price manipula-
tion.46 This issue was complicated because the allegations involved both
wholesale retail sales as well as state antitrust law.47
The central issue decided by the Court in ONEOK was whether the
Natural Gas Act intended for natural gas pricing antitrust remedies to be
under federal purview.48 The NGA did not explicitly bar state antitrust
remedies in the natural gas market.49 The pipelines and the federal gov-
ernment behind them argued that implied preemption prohibits the action
in state court.50 The parties focused on field preemption, a subset of im-
plied preemption.51 Field preemption exists when Congress has enacted
comprehensive law that occupies the field and does not leave any room
for state law.52
The Court ruled in favor a narrow interpretation of federal juris-
diction.53 The Court found that the NGA did not preempt the state power
to regulate.54 Additionally, the Court began to question whether a line
between federal and state jurisdiction existed at all.55 Scalia, in his dissent
claimed that the majority was creating a “snarl” by blurring the lines be-
tween state and federal jurisdiction.56
42 See Rossi, supra note 3, at 430.
43 ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1594 (2015).
44 Id. at 1598.
45 Id. at 1597.
46 Id. at 1598.
47 Id. at 1594.





53 ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1600.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 1601.
56 ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1606 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The majority disagreed with the dissent and petitioner’s argument
that there should be a clear line between federal and state authority in the
natural gas market because the idea of a bright-line rule is not realistic
in the energy market.57 The pipelines and the federal government argued
that the Court find preemption whenever a state law governs anywhere
the NGA regulates Justice Breyer for the majority provided a test to de-
termine if a state law has usurped federal regulation.58
Courts must consider “the target” of the state law in deterring
preemption. Breyer applied the targeting test, and found that the target
of the law is antitrust regulation, which does not fall under the federal
purview of energy regulation.59 The Court distinguished the antitrust
laws directed at all businesses, not solely natural gas companies.60 The
Court indicated that there would be a different result if the state law was
targeting wholesale and interstate natural gas providers.61
III. THE BEGINNING OF CONCURRENT JURISDICTION
In 2016, the Supreme Court would take the final steps in aban-
doning dual sovereignty in FERC v. EPSA.62 The Electric Power Supply
Association challenged FERC Order 745, which established the cost
benefits test that system operators use to determine when it is cost ef-
fective to use demand response resources.63 Demand response is defined
by FERC as “a reduction in the consumption of electric energy by custom-
ers from their expected consumption in response to an increase in the
price of electric energy or to incentive payments designed to induce lower
consumption of electric energy.”64 The test determined when the cost
benefit favored use of the demand response.65 The order further specified
57 ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1601.
58 Id. at 1599.
59 Id. at 1600.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 784.
63 Id. at 767.
64 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, BENEFITS OF DEMAND RESPONSE IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACHIEVING THEM: A REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS




65 Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, Order No.
745, 134 FERC P 61,187 (Mar. 15, 2011).
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that demand response must be compensated at the market rate for whole-
sale generators.66
In Order 745, FERC conceded that demand response was close to
the line between state and federal authority.67 FERC did not attempt to
justify the order solely on its jurisdiction over the wholesale market but
on its duty under the FPA to ensure “just and reasonable” rates.68 The D.C.
Circuit was not convinced however and invalidated the order.69 Under
pressure by state public utility commissions, various interest groups, and
demand response providers the Supreme Court granted certiorari.70
The Supreme Court issued a two-part holding that focused on prag-
matism rather than the text of the FPA. In the first part of the holding,
the Court found that FERC jurisdiction extends to rules that directly
affect wholesale rates.71 By reducing demand in wholesale markets, FERC
is directly affecting wholesale prices.72 The second component of the hold-
ing decided whether Order 745 overstepped the jurisdictional line.73 The
Court, focusing on practicality examined the division between state and
federal authority and rejected the notion that the two could be separated.74
The Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit and noted that FERC of-
fered veto power over wholesale demand response to each jurisdiction.75
In Scalia’s dissent, the last dissent he authored, he indicated that
he believed the FERC acted outside its authority.76 Not only did he reach
a different result, Scalia’s approach was the inverse of the majority.77
While Stevens and the majority begin with a presumption in favor of the
66 Id.
67 Id. at 16,676.
68 Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 753 F.3d 216, 221 (D.C.
Cir. 2014), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016).
69 See Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, at 216 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
70 See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Accepts Case on Electricity Regulation, NY TIMES
(May 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/05/business/energy-environment/supreme
-court-accepts-case-on-electricity-regulation.html [https://perma.cc/CY5T-ZN6P]. See also
Joint State Brief in Support of Petitions for Writ of Certiorari, Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2015) (No. 14-840). But see Opposi-
tion to Petitions for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Elec. Power
Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2015) (No. 14-840).
71 FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 774.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 776.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 779.
76 FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n., 136 S. Ct. 760, 789 (2016) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77 Id. at 785.
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FERC, Scalia would favor the states.78 Scalia advocated for a bright-line
rule between the FERC and state governments.79
Despite Scalia’s concerns, the text of the acts, the legislative history
and surrounding circumstances, and the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of the FPA and NGA all indicate that the purpose of the legislation was
to close the Attleboro Gap. Congress intended to create a federal agency
that could act where states did not have authority.80
Concurrent jurisdiction is not out of line with the text of the FPA
and NGA. The text of the NGA and the FPA do not explicitly give exclusive
power or preemptive authority to the federal regulators.81 Essentially the
text of the acts does not require any jurisdictional doctrine.82 The legisla-
tive intent of the two acts are more telling that Congress intended for the
FPA and NGA to work in unison with the states.83 The Senate Committee
on Interstate Commerce report on the FPA stated that the intent of the bill
was to assist the states and regulate where the states cannot.84 The House
Committee Report on the FPA expressed a similar intent to aid the states.85
Concurrent jurisdiction is consistent with the purpose of the FPA
and the NGA when considering the changing energy markets. Modern
energy markets create different challenges that can be effectively re-
solved with concurrent jurisdiction. Closing regulatory gaps and provid-
ing effective energy regulation is more vital to the reasoning behind the
FPA and the NGA than what jurisdictional test is used. Additionally,
providing FERC with broad authority to regulate the market is especially
beneficial because every state has a different regulatory scheme and re-
quires a different level of intervention. FERC needs the ability to close
regulatory gaps in all fifty states.
IV. CHALLENGES FACING CONCURRENT JURISDICTION
Not only is the new jurisdictional doctrine established by the Su-
preme Court unclear, there is risk that courts will hinder state energy
regulation. The Supreme Court in EPSA left the states the authority to
set the retail prices.86 However, EPSA allows for FERC to set wholesale
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Rossi, supra note 3, at 408.
81 Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824; Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717; see also id.
82 See § 842, § 717.
83 See Rossi, supra note 3, at 441–42.
84 S. Rep. No. 74-621, at 48 (1935).
85 H.R. Rep. No. 74-1318, at 8 (1935).
86 FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 784.
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prices and concedes that FERC does not “run afoul” when “it affects—
even substantially—the quantity or terms of retail sales.”87 The Court
does not appear to be willing to extend this deference to the states.88
In Hughes, the only case after EPSA applying concurrent jurisdic-
tion, the Supreme Court struck down state legislation for interfering with
FERC regulation of wholesale markets.89 The case arose out of legislation
Maryland enacted in an attempt to provide incentives for a new power
plant.90 The Maryland legislation offered incentives based on the PJM
Interconnection,91 the regional transmission organization (“RTO”) estab-
lished by FERC that manages the transmission of wholesale electricity
in Maryland and other states.92 PJM establishes wholesale contract
prices three years in advance.93 Under the Maryland plan, if the contract
price with PJM exceeded the market price, the utilities would pay the
difference to the power plants.94 In other words, the greater the number
of power plants, then the lower the market rate would be, and the power
plants would receive increasingly large payments from the utilities.
The Supreme Court invalidated the legislation.95 The Court found
that it interfered with the system of wholesale rates set by PJM.96 By
providing the power plants with the ability to circumvent the wholesale
rate set by PJM, Maryland impermissibly interfered with the wholesale
market.97
Ginsburg, in her Hughes majority opinion, stated that the Court
“need not and do not address the permissibility of various other measures
States might employ to encourage development of new or clean generation,
including tax incentives, land grants, direct subsidies, construction of
state owned generation facilities, or re-regulation of the energy sector.”98
The majority also explicitly stated that this was a narrow holding appli-
cable only to the Maryland legislation.99
87 Id. at 776.
88 See generally Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016).
89 Id. at 1299.
90 Id. at 1290.
91 Id.
92 Who We Are, PJM (2017), http://www.pjm.com/about-pjm/who-we-are.aspx [https://perma
.cc/SR9H-G33F].
93 Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1290.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 1299.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299.
99 Id.
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The language that Ginsburg uses suggests that the court wishes
to leave the states room to effectuate regulation in the energy market-
place. However, it is still unclear what the states are permitted to enact.
For example, a state-owned generation facility could easily influence
wholesale prices. Ginsburg’s opinion stops short of explicitly allowing the
methods of regulating energy markets that she listed.100 Additionally,
Ginsburg follows up the examples by asserting that state actions “un-
tethered to . . . wholesale market participation” are not foreclosed by the
jurisdictional restrictions.101 However, the Court has recognized that the
line between state and federal jurisdiction is intertwined.102 A broad
interpretation of “untethered” would seemingly conflict with the exam-
ples listed if retail and wholesale rates are tangled.
A. Difficulties in Applying Concurrent Jurisdiction
Proponents of EPSA argue that Scalia is overreacting in his
dissent and that the jurisdictional line is not a snarl but will become
more defined.103 While more definition and clarity will help, states are
still unclear as to what they can enact. Difficulty interpreting Hughes will
at a minimum slow down legislation, but has potential to prevent states
from enacting energy laws or unnecessarily abandoning portions of bills.
A recent example of a state struggling to interpret and apply Hughes and
concurrent jurisdiction can be found in a New York Public Service Com-
mission order where the Commission adopted regulation called the Clean
Energy Standard.104
Proponents and opponents of the Clean Energy Standard each
advocated for a different interpretation of where the state jurisdiction
ended.105 The Commission agreed that there was uncertainty and a po-
tential risk of federal preemption.106 The Commission was concerned that
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 784.
103 See Rossi, supra note 3, at 438.
104 New York Public Service Commission, Proceeding on Motion of the Commission to Im-
plement a Large-Scale Renewable Program and a Clean Energy Standard; Petition of
Constellation Energy Nuclear Group LLC; R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, LLC; and
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, LLC to Initiate a Proceeding to Establish the Facility
Costs for the R.E. Ginna and Nine Mile Point Nuclear Power Plants, 2016 N.Y. PUC
LEXIS 425, 425 (Aug. 1, 2016).
105 Id. at 435.
106 Id. at 152.
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this uncertainty would slow the implementation of the standard.107 In
order to implement the resolution, the state needed the authority to enter
into contracts with utilities.108 If the contracts may be unenforceable, the
private actors may be less willing to participate or may require addi-
tional incentives.109
A second example of a state public utilities commissioner applying
Hughes can be found in Maine’s Investigation of Parameters for Exercis-
ing Authority Pursuant to the Maine Energy Cost Reduction Act.110 Part
of the act included expanding an existing pipeline.111 The Conservation
Law Foundation (“CLF”) alleged that the act was foreclosed by Hughes.112
In 2013, three years before EPSA and Hughes, Maine passed the
act,113 but in 2016 the Public Utilities Commission determined whether
Hughes had any effect on the act.114 CLF argued that Hughes precluded
Maine’s legislation.115 The Commission disagreed and ruled in favor of
the natural gas companies.116 The Commission distinguished Hughes
claiming that the pipeline would not affect wholesale prices set by FERC.117
However, an argument could be made that the plan is not “untethered”
from the whole sale market. Additionally, The Commission in Maine does
not have authority to find federal preemption unless it is apparent.118
The explicitly narrow holding in Hughes may not interfere with the Maine
Energy Cost Reduction Act, but how the Supreme Court will rule on other
state programs remains to be seen.
State officials are not alone in interpreting Hughes. In the limited
time since the opinion was issued, there is at least one case of a federal
judge misinterpreting the holding. In North Dakota v. Heydinger, an Eighth
107 Id. at 153.
108 Id.
109 New York Public Service Commission, supra note 104.
110 See generally Maine Public Utilities Commission, Investigation of Parameters for
Exercising Authority Pursuant to the Maine Energy Cost Reduction Act, 2016 Me. PUC
LEXIS 128 (2016).
111 Id. at 2.
112 Id. at 33.
113 The Maine Energy Cost Reduction Act, Me. Stat. tit. 35 § 1901 (2017); For an in-depth
analysis of federalism challenges facing this act before Hughes, see Benjamin T. McCall,
The Road Less Travelled: The Maine Energy Cost Reduction Act, Economic Federalism,
and a Modern Approach of Preemption Analysis Under The Natural Gas Act of 1938, 67
ME. L. REV. 311 (2015).
114 Maine Public Utilities Commission, Me. PUC LEXIS 128 at 33.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 36.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 37.
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Circuit judge cited the case as supporting dual sovereignty.119 Fortunately,
the misinterpretation was in a concurrence120 and is unlikely to have a
harmful precedential effect.
B. Potential Areas of Conflict
Two areas in which the states are possibly usurping federal juris-
diction are building more power generation stations and updating the
power grid. States are increasingly promoting diverse energy production121
and often are collaborating with the federal government to establish new
energy generation facilities.122 While on first appearance this seems like
a like a matter solely within the federal purview, state government is
necessary to establish new power plants due to their authority to make
retail rates.123
A recent example of state and federal collaboration can be seen in
the construction of nuclear power reactors in Georgia and South Caro-
lina.124 The V.C. Summer nuclear project in South Carolina and the Vogtle
Electric Generating Plant in Georgia received federal assistance but were
only made possible by state legislation that allowed “construction work
in progress” (“CWIP”) costs to be immediately added to the rate charged
to consumers.125 CWIP allowed the utility companies to pay financing
costs without taking more of a loss.126 Allowing upfront financing is a
departure from the standard practice of not adding to the rates until the
power source is servicing customers.127
The state legislation to allow the addition to power rates was not
without critics.128 Opponents have alleged that legislators are giving too
119 North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912, 927 (8th Cir. 2016) (Murphy, J., concurring
in part).
120 Id.
121 For example, see An Act to Promote Energy Diversity, Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 23m § 2;
Governor Baker Signs Comprehensive Energy Diversity Legislation, MASS.GOV (Aug. 8,
2016), http://www.mass.gov/governor/press-office/press-releases/fy2017/governor-baker
-signs-comprehensive-energy-diversity-law.html [https://perma.cc/5FQF-DPZ5].
122 William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism: Ratemaking and Policy In-
novation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 810, 842 (2016).
123 Id.
124 Id. at 847.
125 Id. at 848.
126 Id.
127 Boyd & Carlson, supra note 122.
128 Id., at 849; see also Adam Russell, Another Vogtle Debacle? Cost Overruns, Delays and
Construction Woes Bedevil V.C. Summer Reactor Project in S.C., FRIENDS OF THE EARTH
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much to utility providers and that passing the costs to the customers is
not an acceptable means of reducing costs.129 Much of the criticism may
be warranted as the V.C. Summer nuclear project in South Carolina was
abandoned.130 However, it is not necessary to evaluate the wisdom of this
legislation to recognize that it was within state jurisdiction and success-
fully raised revenue to begin construction on a new reactor. The utilities
were facing a great deal of risk in building a nuclear reactor, even with
federal assistance, and the state action ensured that the plants were ini-
tially financed.131 Georgia and South Carolina decided that nuclear power
was beneficial to their state energy markets and acted to secure new nu-
clear facilities.132 While there are other considerations, both states are
below the national average in energy costs.133
There is a risk that Georgia and South Carolina are impermissibly
affecting the wholesale of energy. However, this situation is where con-
current jurisdiction should be beneficial. Applying a bright-line test could
invalidate the concerted federal and state efforts. The Supreme Court
recognized that retail and wholesale of energy are inextricably related.134
If challenged, the collaborative approach to energy generation should be
upheld. Overturning a scheme like in Georgia or South Carolina would be
detrimental to the energy market. Collaboration by federal and state au-
thorities to provide diverse and affordable energy is in the best interest of
consumers. Even if the projects in Georgia and South Carolina are not suc-
cessful, the method of raising money through CWIP may prove effective.
The second area where state legislation may be invalidated is
state efforts to update the power grid. This challenge is an example of
state experimentation that other states can learn from and emulate or
avoid. As more of the energy grid becomes outdated, upgrading the energy
grid is a costly endeavor.135 The cost of a nationwide “smart grid” is over
$255 billion.136 Modernizing the distribution network will require enabling
(Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.foe.org/news/news-releases/2014-01-another-vogtle-debacle
-cost-overruns-delays-and-construction-woes-at-reactor [https://perma.cc/AKW4-AQAK].
129 Boyd & Carlson, supra note 122, at 849.
130 Brad Plumer, U.S. Nuclear Comeback Stalls as Two Reactors Are Abandoned, NY




133 See State Electricity Profiles, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Jan. 17, 2017), http://www
.eia.gov/electricity/state/ [https://perma.cc/K8QC-CPYW].
134 FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 784.
135 Boyd & Carlson, supra note 122, at 856.
136 Id.
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two-way systems.137 This allows for time-variant pricing and customer-
side generation.138 Similar to the construction of nuclear plants in Geor-
gia and South Carolina, utilities are apprehensive to undertake this kind
of a massive investment without assurances that they will recover their
costs.139 States have approached the task of upgrading distribution sys-
tems in different ways.140
Illinois, for example, has elected to use a performance-based rate
system to encourage utilities to upgrade their distribution systems.141 The
2011 Energy Infrastructure Modernization Act established rate formulas
based on performance objectives.142 The two main energy distributors in
the state can recover costs of upgrading as well as a return for continued
compliance.143 The act also protects consumers from shouldering the costs
and suffering dramatic rate increases if the distributor does not meet a
performance objective.144
By contrast, Massachusetts’ plan for upgrading the energy distribu-
tion grid is the same as the Georgia and South Carolina methods to recover
costs in constructing the nuclear power plants.145 The state requires that
utility distributors submit five-and ten-year plans for grid modernization.146
The state then identifies performance benchmarks to track progress.147
Massachusetts then allows for “targeted cost recovery” to allow for upfront
cost recovery instead of absorbing the costs until they can recover.148
Other states are following these methods or using different tech-
niques to update the grid.149 For example, Maryland and Pennsylvania
are allowing for cost recovery through smart meters.150 Texas has used
advanced metering infrastructure to increase data availability to encour-
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Support for state involvement can be seen in Sotomayor’s concur-
rence in Hughes.152 Sotomayor posited that “courts must be careful not
to confuse the ‘congressionally designed interplay between state and fed-
eral regulation’ . . . for impermissible tension that requires preemption
under the Supremacy Clause.”153 She went on to recognize the states’
important role in furthering the Federal Power Act’s goal of promoting
sustainable and affordable energy.154
Which state method is the most effective will not be known for
some time, and there may not even be a universally effective method. What
is beneficial, however, is the state experimentation in utilizing new technol-
ogies and methods to encourage financial recovery and make the power
grid more cost effective and energy efficient.155 As the Supreme Court
draws the jurisdictional roles, state experimentation must still be permit-
ted. Fortunately, the above examples show fund upgrades to the energy
grid through retail rates. The methods employed by the several states
should fall within their purview despite influencing the wholesale trans-
mission of energy because of the narrow holding in Hughes.156
V. UNCERTAINTY FOR UTILITIES
While energy utility companies rarely receive much sympathy
from the public, regulatory uncertainty is harmful to the industry and
their stakeholders.157 This is an already uncertain time for utilities and
some are advocating for regulatory changes.158 Government programs
that offer incentives for certain technologies, potential new technologies,
and the falling costs of natural gas combine to create uncertainty for en-
ergy utilities.159 However, one of the main sources of concern for utilities
is the increasing use and falling costs of distributed energy resources
(“DER”).160 DERs are defined as small scale power sources that can
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supplement or replace traditional power production to meet demand.161
These small-scale operations are taking an increasing market share from
the large utilities.162
Peter Kind for the Energy Infrastructure Advocates highlighted
this uncertainty and proposed responses to what he calls “disruptive
challenges.”163 As DERs become more common, states and FERC will be
forced to consider additional regulation.164 Kind has offered several sug-
gestions in both the short and long term.165 For example, revising the
tariff structures so that subsidizing one group of customers at the expense
of another, or cross subsidizing, no longer occurs.166 Specifically, regulators
could develop a tariff that reflects the increased service to the customers
that benefit from DERs.167
How regulators decide to address DER is beyond the scope of this
Note, however it offers an example of an area of uncertainty that is then
compounded by regulatory uncertainty. Applying a charge to customers
at a retail level is certainly within the state purview but establishing more
DERs and applying tariffs to access the grid will fall within the whole-
sale of energy. As more utilities seek to acquire DER production, cost
recovery methods will need to be established. Kind’s article demonstrates
the apprehensions investors have about the energy market, and a failure
to establish a cost recovery system will make investors and utilities
hesitant to expand and adapt to the changing energy landscape.168
VI. SOLUTIONS AND NEXT STEPS FOR THE COURT
A. Applying Concurrent Jurisdiction to Establish Federally
Mandated Minimums
Concurrent jurisdiction presents an opportunity for FERC and the
courts to establish a minimum for standards and regulations and allow the
states to enact additional regulation. The Supreme Court has declined
161 Barney L. Capehart, Distributed Energy Resources (DER), WHOLE BUILDING DESIGN
GUIDE (Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.wbdg.org/resources/distributed-energy-resources-der
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to establish “floor preemption” as they have for environmental law in the
past, but with concurrent jurisdiction,169 there may be more leeway for
FERC and the states to adopt more ambitious energy policies.
Concurrent jurisdiction and a congressionally enacted minimum
are consistent with other acts of Congress.170 An example of a congressio-
nally created floor for states to expound upon is the Clean Water Act.171
Congress mandated that state standards lower than the federal levels
would be superseded.172 States are free to adopt more stringent water
quality standards while the EPA enforces a consistent minimum.173
A potential area for collaboration can be seen in the case that
created concurrent jurisdiction, FERC v. EPSA. FERC’s “demand re-
sponse” efforts to reduce energy use by providing incentives to customers
to purchase less was upheld by the Supreme Court.174 The Court allowed
a foray into what was previously state jurisdiction.175 There is no reason
to believe that states cannot adopt demand response measures on the
retail end of the market.
Demand response is vital to certain regions and if it is eliminated,
energy consumers would see large increases in rates.176 Business models
have been designed around demand response and in 2013, demand
response saved PJM $11 billion.177 However, it would be more stable if
FERC could enact a minimum floor level of regulation that states are
free to supplement. States could offer additional subsidies or incentives
to consumers that are able to curtail their energy use.
It remains to be seen if the courts will apply a floor in the inverse
situation. In Hughes, the Supreme Court invalidated a Maryland pro-
gram that established twenty-year contracts with a wholesale rate not set
by FERC.178 The Maryland program cannot be viewed as adding to what
FERC had established as it is counter to FERC action.179 If Maryland
169 See generally Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, Federal Preemption and Clean Energy
Floors, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1283 (2013) (advocating for energy preemption “floors”).
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offered additional incentives, in concert with the rates and contracts es-
tablished by FERC, there may have been a different result. Ginsburg, for
the majority, offered a narrow holding: “We reject Maryland’s program
only because it disregards an interstate wholesale rate required by
FERC.”180 Perhaps by collaborating instead of usurping, the program could
have survived.
The issue will be where states do not want to collaborate with
FERC in decreasing demand. States like South Carolina and Georgia
have taken steps to increase generation rather than to decrease use.181
States taking different approaches is beneficial to the laboratory of
democracy but there could be environmental harm in the meantime.
The Supreme Court recognizes that wholesale and retail rates are
intertwined.182 Allowing FERC to establish minimums that the states can
expound upon is in the best interest of consistency as well as promoting
greener energy use. Limiting what a state is permitted to enact in an
effort to reduce energy consumption and establish clean sources of energy
is counterproductive and would lead to the continued degradation of the
environment.
B. Continuing to Make Narrow Holdings
Ginsburg’s approach in Hughes of making a narrow holding is the
appropriate method at this time. While utilities and other interested
parties would prefer a clear line as quickly as possible, that is not prag-
matic. As mentioned above, there is uncertainty in the energy market.183
Resolving this uncertainty would alleviate some of the concern, but at
the expense of losing flexibility in a dynamic period in the energy mar-
ket. The Court cannot lose the ability to respond to the changes in the
energy marketplace.
Acting conservatively and making narrow holdings will allow
FERC and state legislators to respond to changes in the marketplace. An
overbroad ruling could handicap either the states or FERC in promoting
clean and affordable energy. A broad ruling that limits state power would
stifle innovation at the state level while granting the states too much
authority could create environmental concerns.
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CONCLUSION
How the Supreme Court proceeds to define concurrent jurisdiction
is important; however, by continuing to make pragmatic, narrow hold-
ings this new federalism doctrine will be beneficial to the energy market.
Carefully carving out a role for the states to experiment with innovative
regulation while allowing FERC to establish a baseline will continue the
country’s progress to clean affordable energy. Unfortunately, while the
Court establishes roles for FERC and the states, some confusion, or juris-
dictional “snarl,” will exist. This confusion will subside and the Supreme
Court should resist efforts to make a sweeping or overbroad decision on
jurisdictional roles.

